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ABSTRACT 
Many interesting political institutions, such as campaigning, polls, and sequences of 
elections can not be understood in the context of standard spatial competition models of elections 
with fully informed candidates and voters. To fill this void, we introduce a model of elections in 
which candidates are privately and asymmetrically informed about the electorate. This model differs 
from other incomplete information models, such as the rational expectations model, in that a full 
range of sequential strategic behavior is considered. We begin with a model in which candidates can 
constantly revise their positions before the election. In this case, one might expect each to "invert" 
the other's strategies and infer the other's private information, as is done in equilibrium with rational 
expectations. However, we find that each candidate, knowing the other will try to make such 
inferences, will follow a strategy which is not invertible. No information will leak from one 
candidate to the other. The outcome will be identical to a single-move election with incomplete 
information and no information aggregation will occur. 
The introduction of a public poll changes the results in an interesting way. Candidates still 
use pooling strategies (strategies that are constant on their private information) to avoid leaking 
anything to the opponent but, contrary to the case without the poll, candidates learn about the 
electorate before the election. In equilibrium, candidates use mixed strategies (pure strategy 
equilibria do not exist) and the better infonned player can not prevent the lesser infonned from 
learning from the poll. No private information is leaked but infonnation aggregation occurs. 
We conclude with an examination of the effect on information aggregation of a sequence of 
elections. In the previous results candidates moves were "free" in the sense that revisions were 
costless as in a "cheap talk" model. Now moves are not free and hiding information today in order to 
improve one's chances of winning tomorrow may lower one's chances today. We show that 
infonnation aggregation may occur both through the results of the election (as with the poll) and 
through the leakage of private information. We also provide an example in which the strategic 
choices of the candidates are skewed away from the rational expectations equilibrium. Because of 
the asymmetric information and the strategic issues surrounding information leakage, behavior is 
different than would be observed in simple one-shot elections. 
INFORMATION AGGREGATION IN TWO-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS* 
John 0. Ledyard 
California Institute of Technology 
It has been difficult to explain the relevance of public opinion polls, reporters, and interest 
group endorsements, in an election campaign-indeed it is difficult to understand the purpose of a 
campaign itself-within the context of standard spatial competition models. The problem is that 
these mechanisms have no role in the election process when every voter and candidate is fully 
informed from the beginning of the process. Only in the presence of imperfectly and asymmetrically 
informed agents can campaigns and their associated events have an impact on election processes and 
outcomes.1
To date, modeling of elections with imperfectly informed players has generally2 taken one of 
two approaches which I refer to as the (1) naive and (2) rational expectations models. Neither, 
however, allows a complete and wholly consistent analysis of information processes in elections. In 
the naive approach, illustrated by Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey (1988), voters and candidates are 
modeled as Bayesians who use common knowledge about each other's priors and rationality to 
anticipate all actions and to compute their expected utility maximizing strategies. These are normal 
form models which sidestep issues that would arise in an extensive form. Although the equilibrium 
strategies can be complex contingent plans, such models are naive because they ignore an important 
possibility for the acquisition of information by uninformed agents. They assume that players do not 
look at the actual actions of the others and use that data, and the knowledge of the equilibrium 
strategy, to make better inferences about what the others know and, therefore, better inferences about 
t..lie tru.e state of tl1e \Vorld. This assumption makes sense if all players move o:r.ly once a..1 d 
simultaneously. However, as in most elections, if candidates can continually revise campaign 
strategies up to the actual vote and if voters can change intentions on the basis of endorsements and 
polls and other information about voter preferences and candidate plans, then it is necessary to 
recognize that a standard normal form model, which does not incorporate the possibility of 
sequential adjustment in the specification of strategies is not sufficiently rich. 
Recognizing the fact that voters and candidates can learn from each other's actual moves, 
but trying to preserve as much as possible from the complete information spatial competition model, 
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) take a second approach by adapting the rational expectations 
model of markets3 to elections. Both strategies and expectations are required to be in equilibrium
simultaneously. That is, strategies are best replays given expectations and expectations are fully 
conditioned on the information revealed in the strategic choices.4 For example, if one candidate
knows the median voter's ideal point then this candidate chooses the median as her platform. But 
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the uninformed candidate will know, after observing that choice, exactly what the median position is 
and by choosing that median will ensure a tie with the informed candidate. The equilibrium is the 
same as that in the complete information model. This property of many rational expectations 
equilibria, that in equilibrium even initially uniformed players are fully informed, leads to the 
seeming paradox that there is no incentive to be informed because the other candidate will 
apparently be able to free ride on that information. 5 The source of the paradox is the omission of an 
important strategic consideration in the equilibrium concept. In particular, there is no recognition of 
the fact that the informed candidate, knowing that the uninformed candidate will use the information 
in her strategy choice, may act to mask that information in an effort to mislead by choosing some 
position other than the median. Rational expectations equilibria may not remain as equilibria if a 
wider range of strategies is recognized. 
In this paper we attempt to remedy the omission and to study elections in which candidates 
and voters can be imperfectly and privately informed, wilh a particular emphasis on the strategic 
effects of asymmetric information. We want to know whelher information is aggregated,6 whether
uninformed voters and candidates become informed, and to what extent information asymmetries 
cause outcomes to differ from lhose predicted by the models with completely informed players. As 
we will see below lhe answers depend on the institutional structure that is in place. 
The paper is organized as follows. In sections I and II we introduce lhe model, while 
sections III-V contain lhe analysis. In Section I, we summarize the structure needed from standard, 
complete information spatial competition models and give examples to illustrate the notation. In 
Section II, we introduce the model of asymmetric information and define an equilibrium for the 
naive approach in which candidates can choose strategies conditional on lheir private information 
but not conditional on lhe strategy choice of the olher candidate. In this simple context information 
is valuable because lhe better informed candidate will generally have a higher probability of winning 
the election. In Section III, we look at what happens if candidates can make inferences about the 
other's private information from the olher's strategic choices or, loosely, campaign behavior. We 
are especially interested in the sequence of strategy choices when there are no direct costs to 
changing positions, since when one candidate is fully informed and the other is not, the process is a 
signaling model. In section IV, we introduce a poll in order to generate public information in the 
midst of the strategic choices of the candidates. Again this is viewed as costless. In Section V, we 
replace the poll wilh another election, so lhat lhere is a real opportunity cost to be paid if a candidate 
wants to mask his information. The current election can be lost trying to protect future chances. A 
summary of all the results and some observations are provided in Section VI. 
I. THE STANDARD ELECTION MODEL-COMPLETE INFORMATION 
To introduce notation and to provide a basis for the analysis we begin by summarizing the 
standard spatial competition model of two-candidate elections. Two candidates, A and B , are
presumed to compete by selecting strategies in a space X, where X is a subset of the n -dimensional
Euclidean space. These strategies are often called platforms but can include anything that affects 
voter behavior such as campaign strategies, speech topics and locations, expenditure decisions by 
state or category, timing of announcements, etc. Using a somewhat abusive notation we also let A 
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be the strategy of candidate A and let B be the strategy of candidate B . Candidates are assumed to 
choose strategies to maximize the probability of winning .7 The aggregate behavior of individual 
voters is captured in a function identifying the effect of candidate strategies on the probabilities of 
winning. Let prob {A wins} =TI(A ,B ,m) = 1 -prob {B wins} = 1-TI(B ,A ,m) where m 
parametrizes the voters' behavior. 8 The zero-sum game, denoted by G ={A ,B , X ,  TI, m }, is the 
candidates' game. An equilibrium of the game G is a pair of strategies (A', B ') such that each is a 
best reply to the other. That is, TI(A ,s',m):::; TI(A',s',m):::; TI(A',B ,m) for all A ,B E X . Note 
, , I that TI(A ,B ,m) = 16. 
To see how most specific spatial competition models fit into this framework let us examine 
three. In each, voters are assumed to have preferences over the strategy space captured in a utility 
function U (x, e)  where e are the parameters identifying each particular voter. One interpretation of 
U is that it is the indirect expected utility to the voter if the candidate using strategy x were to win. 
The entire collection of voters is then described by a density function! (e, m ), parameterized by m, 
wheref (e',m ) describes the proportion of the voters whose preferences are defined by e' when the 
true parameter is m' . With this notation in mind we can tum to the examples and derive TI for each. 
Example 1 (The Median Voter, Downs (1957) Enelow and Hinich (1984)): Strategies and the 
parameters e and m are real numbers where e is intetpreted to be the ideal point of the voter and m 
is the median of the distribution of the ideal points. The utility functions are assumed to be single­
peaked ate or, more specifically, U (x, e) = -llx - e II. It is also assumed that there are no 
abstentions. For this model of voter behavior, it is easy to show that 
In equilibrium A = B = m. If the strategy space has more than 1 dimension an equilibrium rarely
exists. 
Example 2 (Rational Abstentions, Ledyard (1984)): The strategy space is n -dimensional and the 
utility function of a typical voter is U (x, e) = V (x, d) - c where e = (d, c ), c is the cost of voting 
for this voter, and d parametrizes the voters' preferences. If we assume thatf (e, m) = g (d ,m)h (c) 
and if abstentions are rational (that is, a voter abstains if and only if the expected benefits from 
voting do not outweigh the cost) then it can be shown that 
{> V2 idV(A ,d)g(d,m)dd > Jvcs ,d)g(d ,m)dd
TI(A,B,m) =V2 = 
<Vi < 
' 
In equilibrium A = B = argmax Jv (x, d)g (d, m )dd. In equilibrium, no one votes but the threat of 
x 
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turnout still drives the candidates. A sufficient condition for equilibrium to exist is that the density 
of the costs of voting is unifonn on [0, C] where C > 0. Equilibrium also exists for other densities. 
Example 3 (Probabilistic Voting, Coughlin and Nitzan (1981)): The strategy space is n­
dimensional. It is assumed that voters vote randomly but systematically and that 
prob { e votes for A } I prob { e votes for B} = U (A , e )/ U (B , e ) . There are no abstentions. For this
model of voter behavior, 
IT(A ,B ,e) = J prob {e votes for A}/ (e ,m)d e .
In equilibrium A = B = argmax f Un U (x, e )] f (e, m )de. Equilibrium exists for a wide range of
x 
densities. 
II. THE STANDARD ELECTION MODEL-INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
We want to study what happens if the candidates do not know m but instead have only some 
private and possibly indirect infonnation about voters.9 The basis for the private infonnation could 
be privately commissioned polls, local knowledge, prior beliefs, experience, etc. We use an 
approach that is standard in game and auction theory and model the election by assuming that 
candidates A and B privately observe signals, a and b. The triple (a, b, m) is assumed to be
distributed according to the density function g (a, b, m) which is common knowledge (as is IT). 
This is a game with imperfect infonnation in which nature moves first and picks a particular value of 
(a, b , m ) . A and B, after seeing a and b respectively, simultaneously select their strategies, A and
B. Voters then vote according to the function IT(A ,B , m) which yields the outcome-someone
wins. An equilibrium is a strategy for each player describing what that candidate will do conditional 
on his or her private infonnation (see Figure 1). 
More formally, the (Bayes) game is G = {A , B, IT(A, B ,m ), g (a, b, m )}. A (contingent)
strategy for candidate A is a function A (a); for B it is a function B (b ) . A (Bayes) equilibrium of G
is a pair of functions A* (a),B* (b) such t.tiat for every a
A* (a) e argmax fIT(A ,B * (b ),m )g (m, a, b )dmdb 
A 
and for every b 
s* (b) e argmin fIT(A * (a),B ,m)g (m ,a,b)dmda .
B 
( 1. 1) 
(1.2) 
To develop a feel for this model let us look at three special cases: (1) symmetric infonnation, (2) no 
in_formation; and (3) extremely asymmetric infonnation. 
Example 4 (Symmetric Information): To model a situation in which A and B are in symmetric
situations, ex ante, 10 with respect to infonnation we assume that a and b are independently and 
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identically distributed, given m. That is, we assume that g (m, a, b) = g 1 (a, m )g 1 (b, m ). For this
informational structure there is a symmetric equilibrium in which A * (s) = B * (s) = C * (s) for every 
signal s .  Further, the ex ante expected probability that A wins is 
fIT[C* (a), C* (b ),m]g 1 (a, m)g 1 (b ,m)dadbdm .
It is easy to see that this probability equals 'h in the absence of any other asymmetries. It is also 
true, however, that the interim 1  expected probability that A wins given a, defined as 
fIT (A * (a),B * (b ),m)g (a, b ,m)dbdm
can be anything between 0 and 1. A similar observation can be made with respect to the ex post 12 
expected probability that A wins given a and b , which is 
Jn[A* (a),B* (b),m)g (a,b,m)dm .
Example 5 (No Prior Information): To model a situation in which neither candidate possesses
information we assume that a and b are distributed independently and identically and that both a 
and b are independent of m .  In this case, g (a ,b ,m) = r (a)r (b )t (m) and in equilibrium 
A * (a) =A* and B * (b) = B *. That is, optimal strategies ignore the signals because, for example, 
given the signal a 
A * (a)E argmax Jn (A ,B* (b ),m)v (b )t (m)dbdm 
A 
and the objective function is independent of a .  One can simply redefine the probability of winning 
as Il* (A ,B) = Jn (A ,B ,m)t (m)dm. The game is now as in Section I with complete information. 
Neither player knows anything of importance that the other doesn't. 
Example 6 (Asymmetrically Informed Candidates): To illustrate the extent to which information 
about the electorate can be valuable for a candidate, consider a case in which A is well informed and 
B knows very little. This might occur because A is the incumbent and knows the district while B is
the challenger with very little experience. To capture this asymmetry we let 
g (a, b, m) = r (a, m )t (b ). B 's signal provides no information while A's signal tells A something 
about m. In effect, the marginal density on m captures what both A and B know about the 
distribution of voters while the correlation between a and m, described by r ( ), determines the 
extent to which A is better informed than B. In equilibrium, B * (b) = B and for every realization of 
fl f nr A * (fl\ n »i l\I{ W1 n \A ".> lJ,., ff'Ar tn/"\C't PV'..lmnlt:>C' 1t �" ...... lt. \ Jn o:i.n "'vtr,,.mn eoa""' .jf' A ;._., .f .. 11.,,, .,..,J ��l�-" \.""/J.....,Jl<f•JY\'"''""/"" -... -'"' \ "'-V.L .U . .LV"'"'-'"""'"'.L.Ul-'"'-'-'LJ U, U� _,- -'�}• LL.L<A.1.1'-'.ll.\..lV.U.J.VV OVJJ..Lf.l .10-'-U-LLJ 
informed, thenA * =A and A E argmax IT[A ,B ,m]. BecauseB <" argmax IT [A ,B ,m], 
A B 
IT [A, B, m] > V2, and, therefore, information is valuable. This example illustrates that an
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incumbency advantage can be derived from the possession of better private information about the 
voting tendencies of the constituency to be served. 
Since A 's equilibrium strategy depends on a, an outside observer could invert the 
relationship after observing the action A*, compute A *-1(A *) = { a  I A *(a)= A*}, and then use 
that information to update his prior. If A *-1(A *)=a*, then the outside observer would know 
everything A does. If B could do this before the election 13 then B could, presumably, minimize 
A 's informational advantage. The election process would be aggregating privately held information 
and the equilibrium might look like a rational expectations equilibrium. Counteracting this tendency 
is the fact that A , as a strategic player, will recognize that B can gain from information leakages and 
A will act to minimize the loss by choosing a different strategy. 
There are at least two questions to be studied. Do elections aggregate information? Do 
informational considerations distort the strategic choices of candidates from those predicted by the 
standard model? As we will see the answers to such questions depend on institutional features like 
the timing of strategic choices, the existence of public polls, and the existence of future elections. 
ill. THE TIMING OF STRATEGIC CHOICES 
If the candidates can react to each other's electoral strategies they may be able to infer each 
other's private information which leads to information aggregation. This is the intuition behind 
rational expectations equilibria. To ascertain whether this intuition is valid in elections, we begin 
with the simplest election scenario. First candidates A and B simultaneously pick, respectively, 
strategies a and p. After observing each other's choices, they choose again by simultaneously 
picking, respectively, A and B, at which point the voters vote. The timing structure is shown in 
Figure 2. The crucial assumption which generates the main theorem in this section, is that the first 
moves, (a, P>. are free in the sense that voters vote only on the basis of A and B . In the economics 
literature this type of move has become known as cheap talk and its use can affect the outcome.14 To 
analyze this new game, we need a tighter equilibrium concept than Bayes equilibrium, which allows 
us to see what occurs when one agent can infer something about the other's private information. We 
use the idea of a sequential equilibrium, the main feature of which is a requirement of sub-game 
perfection-a form of dynarnic rationality. 
More formally, the game is G ={A ,B ,II(A ,B ,m)g(a,b,m)}. A (contingent) strategy for 
candidate A is a pair of functions a(a) andA (a, p,a), and a (contingent) strategy for B is a pair of 
functions p(b) and B (a, p, b )}. A (sequential15 Bayes) equilibrium of G is the 4-tuple of functions 
a(a ), P<b ), A (a, p, a), B (a, p, b) such that for each a 
a(a)E argmax fII[A(a,p(b),a),B(a,p(b),b),m]g(m,a,b)dmdb , (2.1) 
ex 
for each b 
' 
P(b)E argininjII[A(a(a),p,a),B(a(a),p,b),m]g(m a,b)dmda , 
� 
(2.2) 
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for all a, a and for all � such that � = �(b) for some b, 
A(a.�.a)E argmaxfn[A, B(a.�, b), m]g(m, a, b I �=�(b))dmdb , A 
and such that for all �. b and for all a such that a= a(a) for some a, 
B(a, �.b) E argmin J IT[A (a, �.a), B , m]g(m, a, b I a= a(a))dmda . B 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
The key fact that we will observe in this model is that the equilibrium electoral outcomes are 
exactly the same as in the model of the previous section when no reaction is possible. That is, no 
information aggregation occurs and no advantage or disadvantage accrues to either candidate from 
their ability to react to the other. This is true since the equilibrium functions a(a) and �(b) are
constant, (termed pooling strategies), and no inferences can be made about private information. The 
intuition is this: if, say, A were to choose a differently in different states of information then B, 
knowing this and being able to condition on that information, would be able to use that information 
and do better. Since this is a zero-sum game, when B does better A does worse. Anything A says
can and will be used against her. Of course, A can anticipate that B will use the information and can
scramble the signals by permuting the strategic choice of a across signals. If B does not anticipate
this then A will be better off because A would have misled B into using a sub-optimal strategy for
the true state. Of course, B prevents this by ignoring A's a strategy. In equilibrium, A carmot gain
by separating (choosing different a in different information sets) but can lose if B uses the
information. In equilibrium, B cannot lose by ignoring any separation and can lose if A uses any
attempt at inference by B against B . 
For the reader who is unfamiliar with the machinery of Bayesian games, an example is 
helpful. Consider a simple form of Down's model (example 1 in Section 1) in which there are only
two possible medians: m E {L , R }. Assume that each candidate has only 2 strategies. That is,
A, B, a, and� belong to the set{/, r }. (It is not necessary that either l = L or r = R but they can be
interpreted as such.) Finally, assume that B knows the value of m and that A does not. A believes
the probability that m = L is V4. The payoff function can be summarized in a payoff table for A . 
IT(A , B ,L) = A \B l r
l '!2 1 
r 0 V2 
and 
IT(A, B, R)= A \B I l I , l 112 I I 0r 1 '!2 
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The two-move game can then be thought of as follows: 
Move 0: Nature Chooses m, 
Move 1: B picks 13 E {l, r }, A's choice is unimportant since A is uninformed,
Move 2: A picks A E {l, r} , B chooses B = m. 
Those who are familiar with the literature will note that this is just a very simple signaling 
game whose game tree and information sets are given in Figure 3. It is easy to compute that, even if 
mixed strategies are allowed (as long as A can differentiate between different mixtures), the only
equilibria involve B pooling at move 1 and A picking r at move 2. B can pool by picking l whether
the true state is L or R or by picking r whether the true state is L or R . Both strategies leave A 
uninformed. The equilibrium outcome is that B wins if m = L and there is a tie if m = R . This is
identical to the outcome of a one (simultaneous) move game. The ex ante probability that B wins,
calculated before B receives information, is 5ls and the ex ante probability that A wins is %. One can
interpret this as the advantage from being informed. It also indicates that there are gains from the 
acquisition of private information and suggests that an interesting variation, not studied in this paper, 
would be to let candidates buy information (e.g., pay for private polls) rather than simply begin with 
their information in hand. 
To capture the simple intuition from this example in a more general theorem, we first need 
to handle some minor technical details that arise from the possibility of multiple equilibria. We will 
show that pooling at the first stage is an equilibrium strategy. That is, there are constant functions 
a(a) = a' and 13(b) = 13' which are the first part of a sequential equilibrium. There may also be other
equilibria, but both candidates will be indifferent between these and the pooling equilibrium. To 
establish this, we must identify when non-pooling is inessential. 
Definition: Let a*, 13*,A *,B *be an equilibrium satisfying (2). We say that a* is an essentially 
pooled strategy (a symmetric definition applies for 13*) if and oPJy if, for every a, b, rx', 13', a" such
that a'= a*(a ), 13' = 13*(b ), and a"= a*(a'') for some a'', 
Jrr[A *(a', 13', a), B *(a, 13', b ),m Jg (m, a, b I 13' = 13*(b ))dmdb 
= Jrr[A *(a", 13', a),B *(a, 13',b ),rn Jg (m, a, b I 13' = 13*(b ))drndb (3.1) 
and 
Jn[A*(a',13',a),B*(a',13',b),m]g(m,a,b I a' =a*(a))dmda 
= f II[A *(a', 13', a ),B *(a'', 13', b ),rn ]g (m, a, b I a'= a*(a ))d rnda . (3.2) 
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That is, both A and B are indifferent between using the second-move strategy generated by a' and
that generated by ri'. Also both candidates are indifferent between the original equilibrium and that
created by replacing <i with a". 
We can now state the principle result of this section. 
The orem 1: If <a(a ), P<b ), A (a, p, a ), B (ex, p, b )> is an equilibrium of the election game satisfying
(2), then a(·) and PO are essentially pooled strategies.
Proof" Let a*, p*, A *, B* satisfy (2). We prove ex* is essentially pooled. The proof for P* follows
a symmetric argument. Let Z = {ex I a*(a) = a. for some A } . If Z is a singleton then a*() is a
pooled strategy and we are done. So let a, ex", E z with <i � <i', let a*(a) = <i and let a*(a ">=a.". 
From (2.4) it follows that 
fn[A*(a.', p', a), B*(ex', p', b), m]g(m, a, b  I <i =a.*(a))dmda 
:'> fn[A *(a, p', a ), B *(ex", p', b ), m ]g (m, a, b I <i = ex*( a ))dmda 
for all< p', b > such that p' = P*(b ). If we integrate (4.1) over all b we get, (remembering that
p' = P*Cb)), 
JnrA *(a, P*Cb ), a),B *(a, P*(b ), m Jg (m, a , b  I ex'= a.*(a))dmdadb 
(4.1) 
:'> JnrA *(a', P*(b ), a ), B *(a', P*(b ), m )]g (m, a, b I <i = a.*(a ))dmdadb . (4.2) 
Now (2.3) implies that, for all p' such that p' = P*(b) for some b, 
fn[A *(a.', p', a ), p*(a.', p', b ), m ]g (m' a 'b Ip'= P*(b ))dmdb 
:,; JnrA *(a', p', a ), B *(ex", p', b ), m Jg (m, a , b 1 p' = P*Cb ))dmdb .
Integrating (4.3) over all b implies
f I1[A *(a', P*(b ), a ), B *(ex", P*(b ), b ), m ]g (m 'a 'b )dmdb 
:,; f I1[A *(a", P*(b ), a ), B *(ex', P*(b ), b, m )g (m, a , b )dmdb . 
Integrate (4.4) over {a I ex*(a) = a'} and use (4.2) to get
fI1*[A *(a.', P*(b ), a), B *(ex', P*(b ), b ), m]g (m, a , b  I <i = ex*(a))dmdbda 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
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� fTI[A *(a", 13*(b ), a),B*(a", 13*(b ), b ),m ]g(m, a ,b I a= a*(a))dmdbda . (4.5) 
Now we must consider two cases. 
Case I: 3 b ', 13', a', a", a, a" such that a*(a) = a * a*(a ') = a' and 13' = 13*(b ') and at least
one of the inequalities (4.1) or (4.3) is strict. Then (4.5) is strict and 3 at least one a* such that 
a= a*(a *) and 
a i! argmax fTI[A *(a, 13*(b ), a*),B*(a, 13*(b ), b ), m]g (m, a, b )dmdb . 
<J. 
Therefore, (2.1) is contradicted which proves the theorem. 
Case 2: For all a',a ",a', ri', 13', b' such that a'= a*(a'). 13' = 13*(b\ a"= a*(a ') the
inequalities (4.1) and (4.3) are equalities. Then by (3.1) and (3.2), a*O and 13*0 are essentially 
pooled strategies. 
(Q.E.D.) 
Although the ability to react to the strategy of one's electoral opponent and to take 
advantage of inferences about the opponent's private information is potentially beneficial, in 
equilibrium no leakage of information occurs because a candidate can only lose by allowing that to 
happen. The outcome of the electoral process is the same as it was in the one-move model of 
Section II. No aggregation of information occurs. It can also be shown that increasing the number of 
allowed responses or moves in the election process to more than two will not change the 
conclusions. The only strategy choice that will depend, in equilibrium, on one's private information 
is the last one. Nothing important happens until the last move. Rational expectations are not an 
equilibrium. 
Corollary I .I: The outcome of a T -move election (for T finite) is the same as the outcome of a 1-
move election. 
Finally, it is important to observe that the simultaneity of the moves is crucial to some of the 
conclusions. Returning to the simple signaling example with two medians, if B had to choose B 
first and A could choose A after observing B's choice then there are two equilibria. 
Equilibrium 1: B pools and picks r, A reacts by picking r also. In this case, the probability 
thatA wins is Yz for each value of m. B's informational advantage has been lost because of the first 
move. 
Equilibrium 2: B separates and chooses m. A matches B. Again the probability that A
wins is 1/2 for each value of m and B has lost the informational advantage. 
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Candidate A can guarantee at least a tie by matching B's move and, therefore, B neither
gains nor loses from the revelation of the information. Whether information is aggregated in this 
case is indeterminate. 
IV. POLLS
A very natural question to ask is whether the existence of public polls effect the aggregation 
of information. We modify the model in Section III by having a poll taken and the results publicly 
announced between the candidates' first and second moves. First, nature determines the private 
information by picking a and b. Next A and B simultaneously choose and announce CY. and 13. Then
a poll is taken and the result p , which is the proportion of the voters who would vote for A , is
announced. While it would not be difficult to allow for polling errors, we avoid the extra notation 
and assume that the poll result is governed by a non-random relationship p = p( a, 13, m) which is
common knowledge. After the poll results are announced, A and B choose strategies A and B ,
respectively. In accordance with the timing sequence shown in Figure 4, the election is then held 
and the outcome occurs. 
A (sequential) equilibrium is a 4-tuple of conditional strategies 
a(a ), 13(b ), A (CY., 13,p, a ) , B  (CY., 13,p, b) where
AO e argmax Jrr(A ,B( · ),m)g(m ,a,b I 13= 13(b),p = p(a, 13,m))dmdb (5.1) 
A 
B (·) e argmin Jrr(A ( · ),B, m)g(m, a ,  b I CY. =  a(a),p = p(a, 13,m))dmda (5.2) 
B 
a(a) e argmax Jrr[A (a, 13(b ), p(a, 13(b ), m ), a ) ,B (CY., 13(b ), p(a, 13(b ), m ), b ), m] (5.3) 
" 
g(m,a ,b )dmdb 
13(b) e ariwin Jrr[A (a(a ), 13, p(a(a ), 13, m ), a ),B (a(a ), 13, p(a(a ), 13, m ), b ), m] (5.4) 
g(m,a ,b )dmda 
The only difference between these relations and those in (2) is the fact that the choice of A and B is
now conditioned on the information in the poll result, p, which can be affected by the choices of CY. 
and 13. 
Since the equilibrium conditions (5) are notationally complex and since the result we want to 
highlight is easier to understand in an example, we tum to a special case of the median voter model 
which is a bit more complex than that of Section III in that we allow three possible medians, 
m e { L',M',R'}. Each candidate has 3 choices available where A ,B ,a, and 13 all belong to the set
{ L  ,M ,R }. (It is not necessary that either L' = L  ,M' = M  or R' =R but our definition of II will use
that identification.) Finally, assume A knows the value of m and B does not but it is common
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knowledge that B believes the probability that m = L' is Vs, the probability that m = M' is 1/2 and the
probability that m = R' is 3/s. For our example,
II(A ,B , m) = 
ifm =L ' ifm =M ' ifm =R ' 
A \B L M R L M R L M R 
L 'h 1 1 L V2 0 'h L '/2 0 0 
M 0 V2 1 M 1 'h 1 M 1 V2 0 
R 0 0 V2 R 'h 0 'h R 1 1 'h 
Finally, let the function that determines the poll result be the same as the function that determines 
the electoral outcome. That is, let16 p = p( o:, p, m) =II( o:, p, m) . 
To provide a benchmark, let us first examine the outcome when there is no poll. Using the 
model in Section III, it is easy to compute that the equilibrium would involve A pooling in the 
choice of o:. At the second move, A chooses L if m =L',M ifm =M' andR ifm =R'. B's choice
of p is unimportant (B is uninformed). B chooses M at the second move. The ex ante probability 
that A , the informed candidate, wins is %. 
To understand the equilibrium with the poll, we need to work our way back from the last 
move to the first. At the second move, A chooses m no matter what has happened earlier. B 
extracts as much information as possible from the s ignals b , o:, p, and p and then chooses the 
position with the highest probability of being the true median. More formally, for each possible pair 
of first period choices, a. and p, we can calculate B's information after the poll and, therefore, B's 
strategy choice in period 2. B 's information and strategy choices are summarized thus: 
a.\p L 
L LMR 
L 
M MR 
L 
M 
R R 
I 
I 
M R 
L 
L M 
MR R 
LM 
LMR R 
LM 
R LMR 
where, for example, the entry for (a., p) = [L,M] means that if m =L then B knows that m =L and 
B plays L, but if m = l'rf or l?._ ti1 en B &.1ows t1 at m E {l'rf, 1?.} a11d B plays l'vf. (The horizontal 
configurations are the information sets and the bold faced letter is the strategic choice.) 
Given that we know A's and B's second move choices conditional on the true state m and 
the first move choices, we can now compute the best first move choices for each. The following 
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table summarizes the best responses by A to a choice of p fo r  each possible median. 
median\P L M R 
' L L MR RM
' M LMR LMR LMR 
R LM LM R 
Thus, if A knows that the median is R' and B has chosen p equal to L then A is indifferent between
responding with an a of L or M. Since A is "better off' if B can learn nothing from A 's choice of 
a, A should pool. A quick examination of the previous table will show that A can pool with a best 
response by matching B 's choice. For example, if pis R then a should be R, no matter what the 
true median is. This matching and pooling choice also minimizes the information that B can extract 
from the process since p = 'h for every m when the first moves are the same. B learns nothing from 
the first moves or from the poll. 
We can also calculate B 's best response to any a given that A pools. The following table 
summarizes the payoffs to A for each pair of first move choices. 
a\ p L 
L 3!4x 
M 11116 
R 8116° 
M 
11116 
12/16x 
9116 
R 
8/16° 
9116° 
3f4X 
We have identified A's best response in each column with an x and have identified B 's best 
response in each row with an o . The important observation is that there is no pure strategy 
equilibrium! A always moves to prevent B from learning anything by matching B 's position and B 
always moves to separate his position from A's to generate information. There is, however, a mixed 
stiategy equilibrium to t.1.is game. In particular one can show, using L1ie previous table, that if the 
probability that A chooses a equal to L is 1/2 and equal to R is 'h, and if B uses the same mixed 
strategy then that is an equilibrium. A still pools but B can extract, with positive probability, some 
information by using a mixed strategy. When a and pare different (which will happen 'h the time) 
B will be able to infer the true median. The ex ante probability that A wins is 'Ys which is less than 
the probability without the poll. A still retains an advantage from being better informed and A can 
still mask her private information by using a pooling strategy but her advantage is reduced through 
the existence of the public poll. An interesting study, which we do not pursue here, would analyze 
the tradeoffs between private and public polls, and the incentives for the provision of either, 
especially if polling is costly. 
In the more general model the main features of the example survive. That is, as long as 
there are some first period moves by one candidate given the first move of the other candidate, which 
lead the poll to generate useful information for some m, then (1)  there are no pure strategy 
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equilibria, (2) candidates mask their own plivate information up to the election, but (3) information 
aggregation does occur. Let 
1J!(a', 13', a)= JnrA (a', 13', p(a', 13', m ), a), B (a', 13', p(a', 13', m ), b ), m J 
g(m , a, b )dmdb 
where AO and BO satisfy (5.1) and (5.2). Hence 1J! is the indirect utility to A of the last period
game given a. If there are multiple equilibria in (5), each candidate is indifferent between them
because of the zero-sum nature of the game. Therefore, 1J! is well-defined.
Definition: We say that the poll can generate useful information for A if for all 13 there is an a such
that 
f 1J!( a, 13, a )da > f 1J!(l3, 13, a )da . 
For example, if p were constant for all a and 13 then it could generate no useful information. If there
is some 13, such that ( 6) is false for all a then B can, by choosing that 13, ensure that the probability
that he wins is at least as high as it would be without the poll. A poll such that p is identical to TI, as
in the example, can generate useful information for one of A or B as long as both are not already
fully informed. 
Theorem: If p(a, a, m) is constant in m and if p can generate useful information then there is no
equilibrium where a and 13 are pooled pure strategies.
Proof: Suppose that a' and 13' are part of an equilibrium. Then
f1J!(a,13',a)da <:f1J!Cl3', 13',a)da =fcp(a)da , 
where 
cp(a) = fnrA (a),B (b ), m ]g (m, a , b  )dmdb 
and where A (') and B (·) satisfy ( 1). Also, using a symmetric construction for B , 
f1J!(a', 13', a)da s;J1jl(a',a', a)da =fcp(a)da. 
Therefore 
(7) 
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But if p( )- can generate useful information, there is an & such that
f\jf(a, j3', a)da >f\j/(13', 13', a)da =f<J>(a)da 
Therefore there is & such that 
which contradicts (7). 
(Q.E.D.) 
Corollary: Under the hypothesis of the theorem there is an equilibrium where a and 13 are mixed
strategies and, for some realizations of those strategies, information is aggregated. 
With public polling, candidates that are not initially fully informed make their second period 
moves with more information than in the one-shot election analyzed in Section IL An interesting 
question is whether a sequence of free moves, say <Xi. <Xz, . . . , and a sequence of polls, pi. P2 • . . . , 
converge to full information revelation and, therefore, to a fully informed rational expectations 
equilibrium. This remains an open question. 
V. SEQUENCES OF ELECTIONS 
To this point, all preliminary moves of the candidates are free of commitment or cost. That 
fact plus the zero-sum nature of the game leads candidates to choose pooling strategies up to the last 
move so as not to leak information to an opponent. If, on the other hand, an election is held after 
each move, opportunity costs become important. A candidate must assess the trade-off between the 
increase in the probability of winning the current election, by being responsive to the private 
information, and the decrease in the probability of winning the next elections, by revealing the 
information to the opponent. In contiast to our previous n1odels, tl1e existence of U-1e trade-off can 
lead a candidate to a non-pooling strategy which allows some private information to pass to the 
opponent. The trade-off may also lead a candidate to not exploit fully an informational advantage 
today so as to preserve that advantage for tomorrow. 
To see how non-pooling strategies are sustained, we use the simplest modification of the 
earlier models that allows us to study the phenomenon. The election scenario, described in Figure 5, 
has A and B first choosing positions a and 13, respectively. An election is then held and the outcome
occurs according to the function II( a, 13, m ). The outcome is common knowledge. The candidates
then choose A and B , respectively, and another election determines the outcome according to 
IT(A , B, m ). We assume that m does not change between elections, although it is easy to
accommodate a situation in which them in period 1 and the m in period 2 are believed to be 
correlated. 
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Since sequences of elections have not been regularly analyzed i n  the literature, w e  must 
make some assumptions to complete the model. In particular we assume that (1)  candidates have no 
time preference, (2) the value of winning is constant over time, and (3) the value of losing is constant 
over time. Taken together these imply that each expected utility maximizing candidate wishes to 
maximize the sum of the probabilities of winning. 
The equilibrium of the game is a 4-tuple of strategies < a( a ), 13Cb ),A ( a, 13,p, a), 
B ( a, 13,p, b) >where p is the outcome of the first election, such that for all p such that
p =II( a, 13, rn) for some a= a( a) and 13=13(b ), it is true that for all a, a, for all 13 such that 13=13(b) 
for some b 
A(·) E argmaxfII[A, B( a, 13,p,b), m]g( m , a,b I 13= 13(b),p =II( a, 13,rn))dmdb 
A 
for all 13, b, for all a such that a= a( a) for some a , 
for all a 
for all b 
B 0 E argmax fII[A ( a, 13,p, a), B ,rn ]g ( m ,  a, b I a= a( a),p = II( a, 13, m))dmda 
B 
a(·) E argmax frr( a, 13Cb ), m) + II[A ( a, 13(b ), II( a, 13(b ), rn ), a), 
" 
B ( a, 13(b ), II( l3(b ), m ), b ), m ]g ( m, a, b )dmdb 
130 E argmax f II( a( a ), 13, m) + II[A ( a( a  ), 13, II( a( a ), 13, m ), m ), 
p 
B ( a( a), 13, II( a( a ), 13, m ), m )g( m, a, b )dmda . 
To keep the a..nalysis as simple as possible, \Ve re-exa..rnine t11e exa..-rn.ple used i11 section III to 
see what new behavior can occur. Recalling that candidate A was fully informed as to which of 
three possible medians was the true one, it is easy to see that in the second election A will still fully 
exploit Lhat information and will choose A = L if m = L ', etc. The question is what will A do in the
first election? 
Suppose A follows a pooling strategy in equilibrium. We can compute A's total payoff 
from each pair of first election strategies, a and 13, where the computations of the choices A , B and
the payoffs for the second election are identical to those in Section IV. The total payoffs to A , 
conditional on a, 13, and rn, are
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' ' if m =R 'if m =L if m =M 
o:\13 L M R L M R L M R 
L 112+ F 1 + Y2X 1 + Y2 Vz +  Vz o +  Vz Vz +  Y2 Y2+ 1 O + l  O + Y2 
M O + Y2 Vz + F  1 + Ix 1 + Y2X Y2 + Vt' 1 + Y2x 1 + Ix Y2 + Ix O + Y2 
R O + Y2 O + l  1h + 1 lh + lh 0 + 1h 1h + Vz 1 + Vz 1 + Y2x Vz +  Ix 
An x identifies A's best replay(s) in each column. It is easy to see that the only possible pooling 
equilibrium is o: = M .  But then, B's best response is R. Therefore, pure pooling is not an
equilibrium of the sequential election game. There is one partially pooling equilibrium. 
13 = M, o: = (M, M, R) and there is one separating equilibrium 13 = M, o: = (L, M, R ) . In this
example, then, the private information held by A is simply not valuable enough to protect and so A 
chooses o: to maximize the probability of winning election number 1. This tendency to separate
would be reinforced if candidate A had a time preference (a discount rate less than 1) since then 
13 =M, o:= (L,M ,R) is the only equilibrium. 
It is not generally true, however, that candidates necessarily follow separating strategies in 
the first election. To see why consider our example but with different prior beliefs. In particular, 
suppose it is common knowledge that B believes the prob (m = L ') = 1h, the prob (m = M') = %, and
the prob (m = R') = 1/s. Now the unique sequential equilibrium has first election components of
13 = L and O:= (L ,M ,M). This is a partially separating strategy since o:(R) = M . If A were to
separate, then A would win the first election (if m = M' or R ') but A would reveal the information
and tie the second. If A pools, then A wins the first when m = M' or R' and also wins the second if
m = R' since B would choose M in the second. 
In general, with many possible medians (say the whole real line) A can, by choosing just to 
the side of B on which the real median lies, protect her information and win the current election. 
Whether this can go on forever is unknown. 
It does seem to be a general result that the informed candidate will not completely pool since 
full separation would be preferred to full-pooling. The intuition is simple for the case of a fully 
informed ca..'1didate versus an uninformed candidate. In a pooling equilibrium (since A must act as 
uninformed) the probability A wins in period 1 is 1h. Further, since some information may leak the 
probability that A wins in period 2 is less than what it would be if no information leaked. If A were 
to fully separate in equilibrium then the probability A wins the first election is the same as if no 
information has leaked. The probability A wins the second is Y2 since both candidates are fully 
informed. A is therefore better off separating. Complete pooling is not an equilibrium. 
A sequence of elections, then, can lead to the aggregation of information both from the 
election results and from a leakage of information from candidates who cannot afford to risk losing 
today's election in order to protect that information for the next election. A theorem remains to be 
provided for the general case. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS
We have learned several facts about information in elections. First, and perhaps least 
surprising, we have seen that private information is valuable to candidates because it can raise the 
probability of being elected, in a symmetric equilibrium, to above 0.5. 
Second, we found that, even if candidates can react to their opponent's strategic choices and 
make inferences about their opponent's private information, no information aggregation occurs 
because no candidate will follow a strategy that will allow their information to leak. They all follow 
an essentially pooling strategy. The positive benefit due the private information and the constant­
sum nature of the election game provide strong incentives to each candidate to conceal whatever 
they know from the other. Even when a large, finite number of moves are available, the outcome 
remains identical to that which occurs when the candidates can move once simultaneously and, 
therefore, cannot react to their opponent's choices. Rational expectations equilibria will not occur. 
We also noted that if one candidate must move before the other then that candidate loses any 
informational advantage. If the informed candidate must move first then rational expectations 
equilibria may arise. 
Third, we found that adding a public poll to the election process affects strategic choices and 
outcomes. Although each candidate continues to be able to prevent leakage of their private 
information through their (pooling) strategic choice, they cannot prevent their opponent from 
learning through the poll. One might think that the informed candidate could match exactly the 
strategy of her opponent and cause the poll to predict a tie and, therefore, to provide no useful 
information, but her opponent can defeat this tactic with a mixed strategy. Since the poll provides 
both candidates with the same information and since candidates can successfully hide their private 
information, the election outcome with a poll is the same as that of the single choice model in 
Section II if we update each candidate's prior with the poll. 
Fourth, however, the candidates will not be able to hide private information by using a 
pooling strategy in a sequence of elections. Doing so may lead the candidate to lose the current 
election; so there is a cost to hiding information as well as a cost to revealing it. Although we prove 
no general results, we do provide an example that suggests two phenomena: (1) Some information 
aggregation will occur since it will be too costly to fully pool, and (2) candidates will skew their 
behavior in the sense that they will follow different strategies than those which would be best in a 
one-move model. A sequence of two elections with two privately informed candidates is not 
equivalent to two single elections and rational expectations may not occur. 
Necessarily, we have several questions unanswered, and these questions are of three types. 
First, what occurs if the acquisition of the candidates' private information and the public polling 
information is costly? Because information aggregation is not complete, contrary to the assumption 
of a rational expectations equiliblium, there remains a benefit to its acquisition. What happens if the 
collection of private information is endogenous? If, in a simple model we allow plivate polls, in 
which reliability increases with the amount of money spent on it, we could compare the benefits 
from public polls to those of tl1e private polls. 
Second, what occurs if the moves of the candidates are costly? For example, we assume 
throughout that if a candidate uses a sequence of moves A 1,A2, ... , Ar. then the probability that
that candidate wins is II(Ar,Br,m) which does not depend on the early moves. That is, all early
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moves are "cheap talk". An alternate assumption is to suppose that the probability of winning is 
IT(A 1,  . . .  , AT,B 1,  . . .  , BT, m) while pa1tial answers are given by the example of sequential 
elections in Section V and by Bernhardt-Ingberman (1985), Banlcs (1987), and Harrington (1988), a 
more thorough and less ad hoc analysis is required. This would allow us, for example, to better 
understand the informational benefits from incumbency as well as the costs of being "locked" into 
positions. We also need to explicitly merge models of uninformed candidates with models of 
uninformed voters, which requires a much better understanding of the process by which voters 
acquire information. 
Third, what occurs if the number of moves in each sequence is increased? For example, we 
might conjecture that as the number of polls prior to the election is increased, the election outcome 
approaches the outcome predicted by a rational expectations equilibrium. A similar result might be 
available for a large sequence of elections but, since candidates distort their strategies, it may be 
more difficult to establish. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* I would like to thank John Ferejohn who once asked me whether elections aggregated 
information like markets do. (The answer, John, is no.) I would also like to thank Richard
McKelvey for helpful comments.
1 .  For an excellent survey of models of imperfect information in politics, as of 1985, see Calvert 
(1986). 
2. Banks (1987) and Harrington (1988) are exceptions.
3. In the economics literature on rational expectations in markets, players use prices to make 
inferences about others information. See, e.g., Lucas (1972) or Plott and Sunder (1982).
4. For those not familiar with the rational expectations approach, the method by which
information is revealed will be discussed in more detail below.
5. This paradox has also been noted in the economics analysis of markets and caused some 
problems for the efficient markets hypothesis. 
6. We say information is aggregated when the behavior of agents, including their information
inference activities, lead them to act together as if they are fully informed. 
7. For these models, it can be shown that this is equivalent to the maximization of expected utility. 
8. The last equality assumes that the candidates names are unimportant. The entire theory 
presented below can be easily generalized to the case in which names are important and the last
equality does not hold.
9. We do not explicitly consider what the voters know but include their information in the
function IT. Those interested in models with uninformed voters', and in the strategic revelation 
of information by candidates to voters, should consult Banks (1987) and Harrington (1988).
Another model with uninformed voters can be found in McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985).
They do not deal with strategic issues but instead postulate a rational expectations model of
equilibrium behavior.
10. Ex ante refers to the situation before a and b are known.
1 1 .  Interim refers to the situation which exists when A knows a but not b or m and B knows b but 
not a or m .  
12. Ex post describes the situation after a and b are known. 
13. We have assumed in (1 .1)  and (1 .2) thatA and B move simultaneously, so that any chance to 
infer A 's information arises too late to help B strategically.
14. The usual example of a non-free move is a change in platform so radical that voters switch to
the other, more dependable, candidate. Banks (1987) uses a somewhat ad hoc cost proportional 
to the distance Ila - A II to model this. In our context an "opportunity cost" would arise if x
were time indexed as (x 1,xi) = x .  Then the moves a and A would constitute parts of the 
strategy (a,A ). At time 2 , a is fixed and can affect voters reactions to A since 
IT= IT[(a,A ), (�, B  ),m ] .  We assume below in (2) that voters ignore the moves a, �. and let
IT = Il(A ; B ; m) to emphasize the signaling nature of the first moves. L11 section V, \Ve allO\V
the first moves to be costly.
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15. Relations (2. 1 )  to (2.4) are necessary but not sufficient for a sequential equilibrium. An 
additional criterion must be met that specifies how candidates will react to zero-probability 
events. That is, A (a, (3,a ) must also be defined on f3 for which there are no b such that 
f3 = (3(b ). We do not do that here since the results we are interested in below do not depend in 
any crucial way on this extension. The reader is free to apply hls or her favorite refinement. 
16.  In the Downs model and the Coughlin-Nitzan model this identification makes some sense if 
voters correctly reveal their intention to vote. In the Ledyard model of voter behavior it would 
not make sense since voting in the poll (without costs of participation) would follow the median 
voter model while voting in the election would not. 
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